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lfp/ss 02/21/90 MEADOR SALLY-POW 
u.va. Class - Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases 
(Prof. Meador) 
l 
MEMOS. 1757 (the Biden 
jr/-rn_ ~ - 11/4) 
bill) 
This bill (S. 1757) purports to implement the rec-
ommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee. Like our recommenda-
~ 
tions, it provides that a state may "opt" (elect) to be gov-
erned by the bill. There are major differences that proba-
bly would deter any state from electing to comply with S. 
1757. See the Assistant Attorney General's letter in which 
he states that the Biden bill would result in "increased 
delay and confusion" in capital cases. I am inclined to 
agree with him. 
In Woodward v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 380 
(1984)(an opinion I wrote) we noted the way multiple review 
often is obtained in habeas capital cases. I can testify to 
my own experience with piecemeal applications. Sometimes 
there are as many as three the day before an execution. 
Our Committee's Bill 
After trial and direct state review the capital 
defendant would have (i) state post conviction reviews, and 
(ii) one full habeas corpus review through the DC, the CA 
and by cert to the Supreme Court. 
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A unique feature of the Ad Hoc bill is that it 
would require a capital defendant to be provided with compe-
tent counsel "throughout both federal and state collateral 
proceedings" after his conviction and sentence had been af-
firmed on direct appeal. Moreover, a mandatory stay of exe-
cution would remain in effect throughout the process of col-
lateral review. Under the Biden bill, the capital defendant 
would have repetitive reviews as at present. 
I note here that the requirement of competent coun-
sel under our proposal applies to the state collateral re-
view. Thus, the new counsel appointed at that time would be 
free to argue ineffective assistance of the trial counsel. 
I should see Chief Judge Charles Clark's testimony 
before the Biden Committee. Apparently he makes clear that 
s. 1757 departs in fundamental respects from the recommenda-
tions of the Ad Hoc Committee. It would in effect prevent 
the enforcement of the laws of 37 states. 
The Biden bill would permit review of the sentence 
in the event of "newly discovered claims, newly recognized 
rights, and unlawful state action." Under the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee's proposal, none of the foregoing grounds would per-
mit a defendant to raise a claim for the first time in a 
successive habeas petition in the absence of a colorable 
claim of factual innocence. Thus, S. 1757 would reject one 
of the more important recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commit-
3 • 
tee. See the quote from our report on page 4 of the Assist-
ant Attorney General's letter. 
Section 2254(c)(3) of the Biden bill would estab-
lish a further exception to finality. This could occur 
after completion of a first federal habeas review where "a 
stay and consideration of the requested relief are necessary 
to prevent a miscarriage of justice." There is no limiting 
principle as to what constitutes a miscarriage of justice. 
As the Assistant Attorney General's letter notes, this would 
be a "free floating exception" that is linked neither to any 
past inability of the defendant to raise the claim, or to a 
situation where there is a colorable claim of factual inno-
cence. Indeed, under the language of §2257(c)(3) the "mis-
carriage of justice" claim apparently could be raised suc-
cessively in a second, third or fourth federal habeas peti-
tion. 
Filing Period for Post Conviction Proceedings 
The Ad Hoc Committee proposal provides for a 180-
day filing period within which an initial federal habeas 
corpus petition must be filed. This period would be tolled 
during state post-conviction proceedings, with a 60-day ex-
tension for good cause. The Biden limitations period would 
be one year, with a possible extension of up to 90 days. 
Moreover, unlike our proposal, under s. 1754 the limitations 
period would be tolled while a petition for cert is filed 
from state collateral proceedings. 
4 . 
Chief Judge Clark's testimony before the Committee 
correctly noted that the one-year limitations period would 
do no more than codify the present average delay by a de-
fendant moving from state post-conviction to federal habeas 
corpus proceedings. Since our Committee would assure that 
capital defendants will have counsel available throughout 
this period, 180 days seems adequate. 
Rules of Procedural Default 
The Biden bill, in effect, would preclude the ap-
plication in capital cases of the rules of procedural de-
fault. That is, where the defendant fails to raise federal 
claims before the state court. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 
U.S. 72 (1977) in which we held that a federal court on ha-
beas may not consider a claim that could have been raised in 
state courts but was not - that is, where there was a proce-
dural default. We recognized an exception to this rule 
where the defendant could show "cause" - i.e., a satisfac-
tory reason for failure to raise the claim in a timely man-
ner, and also show "prejudice". The constitutional error 
alleged must be so fundamental that it creates doubt as to 
the fairness of the entire proceedings. 
The Ad Hoc Committee would codify the Wainwright 
test. The Biden bill would substantially change the law, 
resulting in further delay. 
5. 
Standards of Counsel 
Section 2261 of the Biden bill would set specific 
standards of counsel's experience required in capital cases. 
In general, representation at all stages would be limited to 
counsel with five years of experience after bar admission, 
and three years of felony litigation experience in the par-
ticular courts in which the case is being adjudicated. 
These are standards similar to those for counsel under the 
death penalty provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. 
These, of course, apply to federal cases. 
It is difficult enough to find competent counsel in 
capital cases. Even where the states provide for compensa-
tion, it may be quite inadequate. Also capital cases last a 
long time, and counsel may find far more profitable repre-
sentation. Also the standards Biden would require would 
exclude a good many lawyers with extensive criminal experi-
ence that may not have include any capital cases. 
* * * 
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I chaired an Ad Hoc Committee of the Judicial Con-
ference formed to consider repetitive use of federal habeas 
corpus in capital cases, This is a problem that has frus-
trated the enforcement of the laws of 37 states. 
We had an experienced committee of able judges 
from both the trial and appellate level. The members were 
Chief Judges Clark and Roney, and District Judges Hodges and 
Barefoot Sanders - all four of these judges are from states 
in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits with extensive experience 
in capital cases. 
Contrary to what many people assume, fed-
eral habeas corpus review of state convictions is not re-
quired by the Constitution. The Constitution itself refers 
to the ancient Writ of Habeas Corpus that was available only 
to challenge executive detention without trial. The federal 
habeas corps review was authorized by Congress in 1867. Of 
course, Congress is free to alter this review. 
It is of interest to note the situation here in the 
District of Columbia. In 1970, Congress eliminated federal 
habeas corpus review by ARticle III courts in the District. 
Thus, while a prisoner across the river in Virginia may 
bring multiple petitions for habeas review in federal court 
after exhausting state remedies, a District of Columbia 
prisoner has no such right. 
In 1982 Judge Carl McGown on CADC (now deceased), 
in a scholarly article, reviewed the experience in the Dis-
3. 
trict. He concluded that the DC system had worked well, and 
that the redundancy of dual review existing in the states is 
not essential to protect constitutional rights. 
It has also been suggested that federal habeas ju-
risdiction should be exercised only where a prisoner is 
unable to secure a "full and fair adjudication" of his 
claims in state court. In this approach, the federal courts 
remain as a backstop to ensure protection of rights. This 
approach to reform is now before the Judiciary Committee in 
s. 88. 
This was the only role of federal habeas corpus for 
many years prior to its expansion by the Supreme Court. 
I have not advocated broad reforms. I emphasize 
that our system of dual collateral review of criminal con-
victions is unique. Also there are no time limits on habeas 
corpus -- a prisoner may challenge a conviction years after 
it has become final, and after witnesses and records are 
long gone. 
Nor is res judicata applicable. Claims may be 
brought again and again. Neither the Constitution nor com-
mon sense requires this. 
The proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee I chaired is 
a limited one. It is aimed specifically at the single area 
where the problems presented by repetitive habeas corpus 
litigation are most acute -- in capital cases. 
4. 
I can speak personally as to the way the present 
system is abused. Each Justice of the Supreme Court is des-
ignated as "Circuit Justice" for a particular federal cir-
cuit. When I was active on the Court I was the Circuit Jus-
tice initially for the old Fifth that included Florida, 
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas. When 
this Circuit was divided, my responsibility included Flori-
da, Georgia and Alabama. 
Petitions for emergency relief, as contrasted with 
the normal petition for certiorari, are filed initially with 
the Circuit Justice. He or she may refer them to the entire 
Court with a recommendation. 
Typically, a capital case goes through the 
following process: State trial and conviction, review by 
the intermediate appellate state court and then by the state 
supreme court. This ma be followed by state collateral re-
view, again through three levels of state courts. 
At this point, usually after substantial delay -
the prisoner will file a petition for federal habeas corpus. 
This goes through the federal system, District Court, Court 
of Appeals, and finally a petition for cert to the Supreme 
Court. 
At this point, the capital defendant's claims of 
error by the trial court may have been reviewed as many as 
11 times. 
5. 
Resourceful counsel - usually new counsel - will 
seek a new trial. When this is denied, the appeal and re-
view process I have described will be repeated - often for a 
third time. More frequently than not the Supreme Court will 
have considered a capital case three times. 
The Chief Justice has aptly described the present 
system as "chaotic". I emphasize, however, that no one 
doubts the seriousness of execution - however horrible the 
crime may have been. My own experience with state and fed-
eral judges enables me to say that we act on capital cases 
with the greatest concern and care. 
Separate procedures are appropriate for capital 
cases because the incentives in these cases are exactly the 
opposite of those involving imprisonment. The prisoner 
serving a term of years seeks to have his case reviewed 
speedily in the hope of gaining release. For the condemned 
inmate, delay is the overriding objective. 
About 20,000 murders are committed in our country 
each year. Only a fraction of the worst murderers convicted 
are sentenced to die. 
There are now approximately 2,200 convicted murder-
ers on death row awaiting execution. Since the Supreme 
Court's 1972 Furman decision, only 117 executions have taken 
place. The average length of time between conviction and 
execution has been more than eight years. Delay of this 
magnitude is hardly necessary for fairness or for thorough 
review. 
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I could join those who argue for outright aboli-
tion of capital punishment. But it seems irrational to re-
tain the penalty, and frustrate its fair implementation. 
A major problem with the present system is the 
need for qualified counsel to represent indigent prisoners 
at all stages. The Constitution requires counsel for the 
trial and direct review. A new federal statute requires 
appointment of counsel on federal habeas in capital cases. 
But this leaves a serious g~p in state systems that do not 
provide counsel for post-conviction review. 
The objective of our Committee's proposal is this: 
Capital cases should be subject to one fair and complete 
course of collateral review through the state and federal 
systems. This review should be free from the time pressure 
of an impending execution, and with the assistance of compe-
tent counsel for the prisoner. When this review has con-
cluded, litigation should end. 
It is important to understand that this proposal is 
optional. It would not be binding on a State. It would 
allow a State to elect to bring collateral litigation in-
volving its capital prisoners within the scope of the new 
federal statute. A State could do this by providing compe-
tent counsel in state post-conviction review. 
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The reduction of unnecessary repetition, increased 
order, and enhanced finality, are the benefits to a State 
that adopts our proposal. But a State would have to provide 
increased safeguards for the rights of prisoners. These 
would include (i) competent counsel, (ii) an automatic stay 
of execution so that the prisoner need not scramble for his 
life in order to have his claim heard, and (iii) a new auto-
matic right of appeal from the federal district court to the 
federal court of appeals. 
In sum, the purpose of the Committee's proposal is 
to advance the fundamental requirement of a justice system 
fairness. Where the death penalty is involved, fairness 
means a searching and impartial review of the propriety of 
the sentence. Fairness also requires that if a prisoner's 
claims are found to be without merit, society is entitled to 
have a lawful penalty carried out without unreasonable 
delay. 
* * * 
My invitation to appear before the Committee spe-
cifically asked that I also address the alternative propos-
al, S. 1757, introduced by your Chairman. Testifying on 
proposed legislation is an unfamiliar and uncomfortable role 
for a judge. But I will, of course, honor your request. 
S. 1757 is based on the structure of our proposal, 
which Senator Thurmond has introduced as S. 1760. But S. 
1757 contains several major alterations. Some of these are· 
aimed at achieving admirable goals -- particularly the as-
surance that quality counsel is provided at both trial and 
appellate stages. 
But some of the changes proposed by S. 1757 are 
costly, and - if I understand them - could result in in-
creased repetition and last minute appeals, not fewer. 
8. 
S. 1757 would provide uniform national standards 
for the qualification of appointed counsel both in collater-
al review and at trial. These are the same standards in the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The goal here is an admirable 
one. 
Our Committee considered including such stand-
ards. We concluded, however, that the States should have 
the first opportunity to devise standards. 
s. 1757 would not allow the States to regulate 
counsel fees, or fees for investigators and expert witness-
es. This could impose an expense on the States that will 
make the reform legislation unattractive. 
s. 1757 expands the limitations period in our pro-
posal from six months to one year. Six months is longer 
than the time for appeal in other areas of law. It was our 
Committee's judgment that six months was an ample period 
where counsel is provided. 
With respect to finality and repetition, there are 
three areas of some concern. First, S. 1757 expands the 
situations in which prisoners may bring repetitive peti-
tions. 
Under our proposal, a prisoner can bring a repeat 
petition where there is any question as to his innocence. 
This is fair and necessary. 
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But S. 1757 would go well beyond this. Repetitive 
petitions would be allowed even where innocence was not an 
issue. Indeed, innocence of the crime rarely is an issue. 
As I understand S. 1757, it would allow repeat 
challenges to the sentence as well as to guilt of the crime. 
This would invite repetitive litigation. 
Our Committee concluded that it was fair to ask the 
prisoner, who has counsel, to raise all challenges to sen-
tence the first time around. 
The Supreme Court has held that mitigating evi-
dence, relevant to sentencing, can be virtually unlimited. 
In Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) we held that any relevant 
mitigating evidence may be admitted in determining the sen-
tence in a capital case. In identifying types of such evi-
dence, the Court that "evidence of a difficult family histo-
ry, and of emotional disturbance", as an example of mitigat-
ing evidence. 
In a word, there would be no limit to evidence 
that arguably may be relevant with respect to the sentence 
in capital cases. This means that last minute claims can be 
constructed very easily in any case. 
10. 
Another area of concern is the law of procedural 
default. The rules of "procedural default" involve state 
requirements that a defendant raise an objection to errors 
at the time of trial, when the error may be corrected. If 
the defense does not raise the objection, the opportunity to 
raise it have been waived. Wainwright v. Sykes. 
This serves the purpose of seeing that errors are 
pointed out when something can be done, not years later in 
attempt to win a new trial. The changes proposed in S. 1757 
are contrary to several Supreme Court cases. [See footnote 
in written testimony. Wainwright, Smith v. Murray, Engle v. 
Isaac.] They would make it easier for a prisoner to raise 
claims for the first time long after trial. 
Finally, s. 1757 adds a new section to our proposal 
that would overrule recent Supreme Court decisions that pro-
mote finality. See Teague v. Lane (1989) Penry v. Lynauth 
(1989). Under these decisions, the legality of a prisoner's 
sentence is usually determined by the law in effect at the 
time of his trial and direct appeal. 
s. 1757 changes this, and would allow prisoners in 
many cases to challenge their convictions and sentences on 
the basis of law that was not on the books when they were 
tried. 
As I have noted earlier, the changes in existing 
law proposed by our Ad Hoc Committee and by S. 1757 will 
become effective only in states that agree to the changes. 
11. 
My concern is that the provisions of S. 1757, I have briefly 
identified would discourage state acceptance. 
* * * 
Before closing, I do want to emphasize that it is 
clear from S. 1757, as well as S. 1760 that, there is gener-
al agreement as to the need for reform in this important 
area. The Supreme Court has stated that the justifications 
for capital punishment are retribution and deterrence. Nei-
ther purpose is served by repetitive review of every capital 
case. Delay robs the penalty of much of its deterrent val-
ue. 
As ~ some 20,000 murders are committed each 
year in our country. Our Committee recognized the need for 
a critical reexamination of our open ended system of review, 
regardless of innocence. 
We hope we have made a contribution to the consid-
eration of this extremely important problem. 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
